Renewed contract reinforces the value of vendor-neutral sensor integration and a unified common operating picture for Counter-UAS operations

At CENTCOM’s EXTiC 26-2, UNIFY.C2 connected six previously unintegrated sensor modalities into one Common Operating Picture, demonstrating rapid interoperability under operationally relevant conditions.

UNIFY.C2 has been selected to deliver the integrated Counter-UAS Common Operating Picture at Beale Air Force Base, consolidating drone detection and airspace data into a single interface for the installation.

OWL radar now feeds the UNIFY.C2 Common Operating Picture, adding long-range detection and tracking alongside EO/IR, RF and mitigation. One more sensor in the ecosystem, one less separate screen for the operator.

Black River Systems' Ninja Counter-UAS sensing and mitigation now feeds the UNIFY.C2 command-and-control environment, giving defense and government operators another integrated option inside the same picture.

HGH Infrared's SPYNEL X wide-area MWIR sensors now feed UNIFY.C2, adding passive long-range detection of airborne threats to a single command-and-control interface. Passive, so nothing has to transmit to see.

UNIFY.C2 expands its integrated airspace command-and-control platform with native Dronetag Remote ID capabilities—delivering real-time identification, correlation, and operational clarity across complex airspace for defense, public safety, and critical infrastructure.

No single sensor stops the drone threat. Radar misses what RF catches, RF misses what optics confirm. The case for a layered, interoperable Counter-UAS architecture, drawn from Counter-UAS Homeland Security Europe.

Field notes from Counter-UAS Homeland Security Europe. No agency solves the drone problem alone, and the conversations that mattered were about turning cross-sector collaboration into capability rather than another working group.

Task Force 401 and a new quick reaction force concept are reshaping how the US defends its installations against drones. What the shift means for Counter-UAS command and control, and for the systems already fielded.

Airport closures and airspace incursions across Vilnius, Brussels and beyond exposed how unprepared NATO members remain for cross-border drone activity, and how quickly disruption follows uncertainty.

The Department of Defense's strategy for countering unmanned systems signals a significant shift in how the United States organises drone defense at home, and in what it expects from command and control.

Drone incursions over RAF Lakenheath, Mildenhall, Feltwell and Fairford exposed detection gaps across overseas US installations in late 2024, and raised the question of who holds authority to respond abroad.

A Chinese national faces espionage charges over drone photography of US Navy shipyards. A reminder that airspace awareness is a counterintelligence question as much as a physical security one.